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Article 5

NOTES ON RECENT CASES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Police Power-General Zoning Ordinance. The Missouri Supreme Court by a 4 to 3 decision recently upheld the constitutionality of a Zoning Ordinance
of the city of. St. Louis. State ex rel. Oliver Cadilac Co. v. Christopher, City Building Commissioner of St. Louis, et al., Supreme Court
of Missouri, 298 S. W. 720. The ordinance in question divided
the city into five use districts as follows: 1. Residence districts (including single and double houses, churches, schools,
and libraries); 2. Multiple dwelling districts (including hotels,
private lodges or clubs, boarding houses, and hospitals); 3.
Commercial districts; 4. Industrial Disricts; 5. Unrestricted
districts.
The state at the relation of the Oliver Cadilac Co. brought
a proceeding in mandamus against the building commissioner
and director of public safety of St. Louis to compel them to issue the Oliver Cadilac Co. a permit for the erection on the corner
of Lindell Boulevard and Sarah Street in St. Louis, of a twostory, fireproof, brick and stone building to be used as an automobile display building and as a place of business for the sale of
automobile parts and accessories. The permit was refused because the zoning ordinance which was to go into effect two days
later placed the property in question in the multiple dwelling
district, and forbade the erection of places of business therein.
The Court in upholding the constitutionality of the Zoning
Law stated that it followed the trend of American opinion,
citing: Village of E.uclid v. Amnbler Realty Co., 47 Sup. Ct. 114;
Miller v. Board of Public Works, 195 Cal. 477; State ex rel. Civelio
v. New Orleans, 154 La. 271; Wulfsohn v. Burden, 241 N. Y. 288;
City of Aurora v. Burns, 319 Ill. 84; and many others. It was contended that the constitution of Missouri was peculiar in regard to its
limitation on the taking of private property for public use, as it provided that "private property shall not be taken or danzaged for public
use without just compensation"
The court held, however, that
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the word "damaged" did not broaden the limitation of the power
of eminent domain, but was merely added to assist in construction. The court further stated that to zone a city like St. Louis
by means of condemnation proceedings was a practical impossibility, and that as the difference between the police power and
the power of eminent domain was very slight and only one of
degree, the Zoning Law represented a valid exercise of the police
power.
The provisions of the ordinance were held to be reasonable,
and a Louisiana case was cited in justification of Zoning Ordinances. This case reasoned that such laws permitted a reduction
in the police force, decreased fire hazards, encouraged economy
in paving, made a neighborhood more peaceable and enjoyable,
increased the scenic beauty of the city, and prevented the breeding of rats, mice, flies, ants, roaches, etc., in the residential districts. The fact that the applicant sought a building permit two
days before the statute went into effect was held to be immaterial.
Judge Graves wrote an elaborate dissenting opinion which
will warm the hearts of those students who still believe that
private property is a fundamental right in rem, and that the
ideals of American democracy are individual liberty and individual rights rather than an ephemeral "summum bonum" in the
form of aesthetic beauty. Judge Graves contends that the
"present opinion extends the police power to the destruction of
private property and private rights. Under this broad doctrine of
police power, the city authorities could take the whole of a person's property without a cent of compensation"
The dissentor
waxes vituperative in his denunciation of the court's recognition
of Mr. Frank B. Williams as an authority on the "The Law of
City Planning and Zoning". Mr. Williams who is an avowed
student of city zoning ordinances is cited by the Judge as favoring the abolition of state governments, "the Bill of Rights and
similar guarantees in the State Constiutions in order to simplify
procedure and lessen expense" Judge Graves also states that
this decision overrules a line of Missouri cases without even
mentioning them.
Little did the French settlers of St. Louis some two hundred
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*years ago ever dream that by any perversion of law they might
be prevented to-morrow from building a trading post on the
ground on which they resided to-day. Under such liberal views
St. Louis progressed; but now under the guise of progress
Aman who owns a
modern reformers have halted progress.
valuable commercial site to-day will discover that he owns a
mere residence plot to-morrow. He will find that he has "bought
a pig in a poke", a misdeed detested by all Missourians.
The Supreme Court of Missouri can scarcely.be censured
for following the Supreme Court of the land, but "they might
have been congratulated had they frowned upon this invasion
of property rights and "condemnation without compensation",
rather than encouraged it.
-WILLIAM

J.

COYNE

CITIZENS-Offspring of Polygamous Marriage of Citizen
in Foreign Country-Conflict. The Circuit Court of Appeals,
Ninth Circuit, recently dealt with an interesting question of
citizenship. Ng Suey Hi was refused admittance to the United
States by the Commissioner of Immigration at the Port of
Seattle, Washington. She then petitioned the District Court of
the United States for a writ of habeas corpus, the denial of which
was followed by an appeal. Her contention was that, being the
daughter of a citizen of the United States, she was entitled to
entry into this country as a citizen. Her father had been
born in California, but had lived many years in China. At the
time of the hearing he was a resident of New Jersey. While in
China, the father married a Chinese woman, and three years after
his first marriage he married a second woman of the same race.
He lived with these two women in the same household, and Ng
Suey Hi was born of the second marriage while her father's first
wife was also living and cohabiting with him. Under our laws,
then, Ng Suey Hi was an illegitimate child.
The law applicable to marriage contracts, as a general rule,
is the law. of the place where the contract is entered into. This
rule, however, is not applied where the contract is against the
public policy of the domicile of the parties. Polygamous marriages are contrary to the laws of all Christian countries, and the
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courts of this country cannot recognize such a marriage even
though valid in the country where it is contracted. Petitioner
was a bastard child, born abroad of a citizen, and as.such was not
entitled to citizenship. (11 C. J. 780). Whatever might have
been the effect of subsequent legitimation upon her status was
not considered, since no evidence of such legitimation was offered.
As petitioner was not a citizen of the United States at birth, and
no subsequent matter giving her a claim to citizenship was
shown, the judgment of the District Court was affirmed. Ng Suey
Hi v. Weedin, Commissioner of Immigration, 21 Fed. (2d) 8oi.
-HENRY

HASLEY

CONFLICT OF LAWS-Sale of liquor not inherently vicious. A sale of intoxicating liquor is held not to be so inherently wicked, vicious or immoral in the recent Arizona case
of Veytia v. Alverez, 247 Pac. 117, that a court in this country
will not enforce a contract for such sale, valid in a foreign jurisdiction where made, notwithstanding the constitution and laws
of this country forbid such sale. This case is a clear and concise
illustration of a well settled principle of law that a contract valid
where made is valid everywhere. The law of the place where
the contract is made, is prima facie that which the parties intended to prevail in the absence of circumstances indicating a
different intention. The case also indicates that a contract,
valid in the country where made, will be enforced in a foreign
court unless so inherently vicious that comity does not require its
enforcement. See 49 A. L. R. 994, 38 N. J. Eq. 219, 97 Am.
Dec. 671. Contra-155 Ill. 617, 40 N. E. 839, 39 L. R. A. (N.
S.) 1005.
CRIMINAL LAW-Insufficiency of evidence. In the case
of Thornhill v. State, 260 Pac. 519, the defendant was found guilty
of the charge of selling and delivering to one B. E. Slagle intoxicating liquor. He appealed, assigning numerous errors.
B. E. Slagle, witness for the state, testified that Thornhill
had been pointed out to him, among several others, by Tony
Lawrence, a German restaurant keeper, as one whom he thought
was boot-legging; that he asked the defendant whether or not
he could buy some liquor from him; that defendant said he would
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try to obtain some for him; that defendant did deliver a pint of
whiskey to Slagle at the hotel; that Slagle was doing undercover
work for the city officials; and that no person had been presented
during any part of the transaction between Slagle and Thornhill.
Defendant, as witness in his own behalf, testified that he
heard Slagle say on several previous occasions that he was a
spotter; that he saw Slagle at the Lawrence Hotel where the
boys were raw-hiding him about being a spotter; and that he
never sold Slagle liquor of any kind.
Tony Lawrence also testified that he had never pointed out
any person to Slagle; that Slagle had pretended to be a demonstrator of a patent; and that Slagle had offered him a drink of
whiskey, asking him (the restaurant keeper) if he knew where he
could get more.
Twelve witnesses gave testimony to the effect that Slagle's
general reputation for truth and veracity was bad.
It was held that, verdict was contrary to evidence; it was insufficient to support a conviction for the sale of intoxicating liquor.
ALBERT T. FRANZ
CRIMINAL LAW-Writ of Quo Warranto PermittedSunday Baseball. Defendant, a corporation, played a game of
baseball on Sunday, August 22, 1927; to which the public was
admitted on payment of an admission fee. Attorney General
filed a writ of quo warranto, averring that the playing of baseball
on Sunday was a violation of the Act of April 22, 1794 (3 Srriiths
Laws, 177). 138 Atl. 497 Commonwealth e.r rel. Woodrutf, Attorney General v. American Basebal Club of Philadelphia.
Defendant deny that playing baseball on Sunday was a violation of the Act of 1794 and averred that a writ of quo warranto
would not lie; because the sole penalty as provided by the Act
was the payment of the sum of four dollars.
The court below, entered a judgment that defendant be
ousted from any right, privilege or authority to maintain or conduct on its grounds, a game of baseball on Sunday and directed
a perpetual injunction refraining it from so doing.
Schaffer v. The Act reads "If any person shall do or perform
any wordly employment or business whatsoever on the Lords
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Day, commonly called Sunday (works of necessity and charity
only excepted) and be convicted thermof, every such person, so
offending, shall, for every such offense, forfeit and pay four
dollars, to be levied by distress; in case he or she shall refuse or
neglect to pay-the said sum-he or she shall suffer six days imprisonment in the house of correction of the proper county. The
word "wordly" as here used means "concerned with the enjoyments of this present existence; secular", "not religious, spiritual,
or holy". The court said we cannot imagine in this sense anything more wordly or unreligious in the way of employment than
the playing of professional baseball as it is played today. It is
not only wordly employment which is forbidden but business.
"The business is giving exhibitions of baseball (FederalBaseball Club
v. National League, 259 U. S. 2001). Similarily the conduction a
circus, or running a theater is a business. The participants are
hired and the public is admitted for a price.
The court stated that Christianity is part of the common
law of Pennsylvania and its people are Christian people. Sunday is the holy day among Christians, and in no way, does professional baseball partake of holiness; and must be categoried as
wordly, and as such is in violation of the Act of 1794. Lack of
noise, disturbance or breach of peace does not take away any
guilt from the offense.
The court held that a writ of quo warranto was proper "A
corporation may be ousted from the exercise of powers not
granted and power forbidden to be exercised" (Pa. St. 1920 No.
18362), saying that "It would be an unthinkable proposition that
the commonwealth would create organizations to break its own
laws. Especially when a corporation of its own creation, avows
its right and power to nullify a criminal statute.
'As to the penalty provided in the statute, it does not mean
that it is the exclusive remedy, and does not preclude the Attorney General from proceeding against the corporation, with
the view to prohibit the misuse of a franchise granted by the
state.
Judgment and decree of court below affirmed. Maschzisker
C. J. and Kephart J. dissenting. On the grounds that the only
penalty that could be imposed was the one provided by the sta-
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tute, and that the proceedings in his case were improper, because hey imposed additional punishment by way of judicial construction. Such an increase of punishment is for the legislature,
and not for the courts to decide.
-E. F. MCCLARNON
DEDICATION-In the case of Swartwout v.'Caledonia Township
215 N. W. 293, there is the questionof acceptance of a dedication
after a number of years have elapsed. In 1909 a Mrs. Gerow, the
owner of a parcel of land had it platted into lots. The plat was
approved by the township board and a number of lots were sold.
Nothing was done by the township board to show an acceptance
of the dedication and the only use made of the ground was when
people at times wandered over the subdivision or camped on it.
Durinig the intervening years the subsequent grantees of Mrs.
Gerow obstructed the land from travel and in March 1926 the
township board directed the highway commissioner to remove
the obstructions and the plaintiffs filed this bill to restrain the
interference by the township of its officers and agents.
It was held that persons travelling over land do not show
public authorities acceptance of offer to dedicate and the sale of
lots was not evidence of acceptance of offer to dedicate; also that
the acceptance of an offer to dedicate streets sixteen years after
it was made and after acts showing an intent to revoke had been
done, was too late.
-MARC

WONDERLI-N.

EVIDENCE-Autopsy privileged as confidential communication between physician performing autopsy and dead man.
In an action on an insurance policy by the plaintiff as beneficiary
of a deceased's policy, a physician who performed the autopsy
on the deceased, was permitted to testify over objection of the
plaintiff as to the result of the autopsy performed by him, which
testimony was so damaging that it removed liability from the
insurance company. The physician was employed by the hospital in which the deceased was a patient at the time of his death,
but the physician had never seen nor attended him prior to the
performance of the autopsy. Mathwcs v. Re'x Health and Accident
Insurance Company, 157 N. E. 467, Indiana (1927).
It must be noted that this case was based on the statute of
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Indiana which prescribes that doctors are not compitent witnesses "as to-rhatters communicated to them, as such, by patients, in the courses of their professional business or advice
given on such occassions". Ind. Ann. Stat. Burns, 1926 Par 550.
The statute clearly states "by patients" it will be observed. " Two
courts have passed upon the question as to whether or not a dead
person can be a patient. In Crmody v. Capitol Tractionr Company,
43 App. Cas. D. C. 245, (1915); Harrison v. Sutter St. Ry., 116
Calif. 156, 47 Pac. 1009 (1897). These two courts held that a
dead person could not be a patient for purposes of autopsy if
the physician performing the said autopsy had no relation with
the per.son before death, because when a person dies "his body is
of clay for grave diggers and undertakers".
It is a well settled rule that an autopsy performed by a physician who attended deceased before death is the subject of communication because the autopsy was part of the treatment.
Thomas v. Toumrnship of Byron, 168 Mich. 593, 134 N. W. 1021
(1912).
Privilege is given to physician and patient to protect confidential disclosures in the practice of medicine, and it is stated
in 5 Wigmore Evidence (edition 1923) paragraph 2380, that extenson of this rule of privilege should be narrow, and it is not
expedient to extend it. In Borosich v. Metropolitan Life Insurance
Company, 210 N. W., 829 (1926) ; Chadwick v. Beneficial Life Insurance Company, 191 Pac. 448, it-was held autopsy not privileged
unless physician performing autopsy also attended the deceased
as a patient which is the general rule.
The majority of these cases involving autopsy and privileged
communication are actions on an insurance policy where the
policy holder's health was misrepresented at the time of the issuance of the policy nd all the medical testimony available
should be procurred for the jury. In a majority of these insurance cases where facts are withheld tenaciously there is an
element of fraud to be considered and such procedure should
not be encouraged by statute or decisions which extend the
privilege beyond its narrow limits.
'THOMAS V. HAPPER.
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HABEAS CORPUS-Cannot be substituted for a writ of
Error. The Defendant was convicted of the crime of rape, which
under the statute was punishable by imprisonment in the state
penetentiary for not exceeding 20 years. He was given an intermediate sentence of not less than 10 nor mor than 20 years.
The warden and the boards of charities and correction later fixed
the term at ten years. The Defendant then sued out a writ of
Habeas Corpus to secure his release. The Supreme Court of
South Dakota in State ex rel. Anderson v. Jameson, Warden,
215, N. W. 697, denied the writ saying that it was a rule that
where the court had jurisdiction of the person and of the offense,
and errs merely in regard to the punishment imposed, relief will
not be granted by habeas corpus. The remedy in such case is
a writ of error. The writ deals only with such iadical defects as
render the proceeding or judgment absolutely void. See 11 Ann.
cases 1055, 151 U. S. 242, 208 N. W. 224, 268 U. S. 442, and 12
R. C. L. 1207.
MORTGAGES-Removal of mortgaged property from
state. A chattel mortgage was given on personal property located in Minnesota. Later the Mortgagor removed to Iowa,
where he gave a mortgage to the Appelant in Iowa on some of
the identical property previously mortgaged in Minn. Both of
the mortgages were duly recorded according to the laws of the
states wherein the property was located at the time the mortgage was given. The Sheriff was about to sell the property for
the benefit of the Iowa mortgagee when this action was brought
to restrain the sale. The question was whether the Iowa court
should recognize the Minn. mortgage. The Iowa court in First
Nat'l Bank of Elssworth V. Ripley, Sheriff, et al, held that the
validity of a -chattel mortgage is determined by the law of the
situs of the property at the time of the mortgage. Rights created under a valid mortgage will be recognized in another state
as against the mortgagor or his creditors or subsequent purchasers from him. The rights of the mortgagee must be protected. This decision represents a very just and reasonable rule
of law which is well established by judicial precedent. See collection of cases 64 L. R. A. 365 note; 35 L. R. A. (N. S.) 386, 176
Mich. 216, 141 N. W. 827, and II Corpus Juris, p. 424.
-EDWARD

P. MCGUIRE.
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MONOPOLIES-Restraint of interstate commerce not
justified because ultimate object was .to secure lawful ulterior
benefit. The conflict between labor and capital is probably the
oldest conflict in the world with the exception of the conflict between man and man. Every decision handed down by the courts
of justice is bound .co be criticized by the adherents of the two
factions, and most of the decisions are swayed by political views,
not unaturally because this is a political quIestion. The Stonecutter Case has not escaped criticism pro and con by the economic wagers of battle, capital and labor.. Labor has especially
criticized this case vehemently as another invasion on the security of organized labor. (Bedford Cut Stone Co. v. Journeyman
Stone Cutter Ass'n, 47 Sup. Ct. Rep. 522).
The case arose with a bill in equity to enjoin the defendants
and the members of the union from combining and conspiring
together to commit various acts that were a restraint of interstate commerce of the petitioners trade, in violation of the Sherman and Clayton acts. The petition was not to compel the defendants stonecutters to return to work for the employers against
whom they struck, but was merely an action to obliterate the socalled conspiracy to refuse to work on the non-union cut stone
of the petitioners.
The petitioner's and nearly two dozen others were engaged
in the quarrying of limestone in the -state of Indiana, near Bloomington, three-fourths of their business being interstate and onefourth intra-state. The defendans are stonecutter's organized
in the form of a union with a membership of nearly five thousand
persons, this particular union is particularly potential and the
petitioners had formerly respected the power the defendants had
over the building trade and fell in line with them and co-operated
with them, in their policies on the closed shop. Later the petitioners deviated from the policy and the defendants union ordered its members not to handle the petitioners stone. The result of this action was that many neutral parties that used the
petitioners stone who were not involved in the controversy were
struck against by the union workers of the defendant. The
Supreme Court of the United States by a vote of 7 to 2 decided in
favor of the petitioner basing the opinion on the authority of
Duplex v. Deering, 4 Sup. Ct. r72. The court held that the ultimate
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object of the union was lawful, for the purpose of unionizing the
workers in the stonecutters trade at the quarry, nevertheless
the means did not justify the end, namely, destroying the market
for those products in other states. -That it was a violation of
the acts prohibiting the restraint of trade.
Justices Brandies and Holmes dissented and refused to follow the Duplex case as prior authority for the present proposition. Their contention was that refusal to work can not be enjoined in a court of equity and that the Sherman and Clayton
laws were never meant to be applied to deny the members of a
small craft of workmen the right to co-operate by refraining from
work, when such means was the only method of surviving a combination of oppressive and powerful employers. The justices
who dissented evidently believed the case dangerously near one
of enforcing involuntary -servitude, but this was not the case.
Theoretically there is a neutral balance point between capital
and labor and the court was called upon in this case to decide
the proper balance of power, whether a body of men could quit
work in concert or not when such conspiracy clogged the channels of economic progress and was a means to a restraint of
trade. The court decided the case on strong principles. Involuntary servitude should never be enforced against an individual or a group of individuals and the court did not 'decide to
that effect. The court admitted the means to the end to be lawful and did not declare that the unions as a means to a good end
were unlawful or should be enjoined. But the Supreme Court
did declare that a union could not restrain the channels of trade,
a bad end by a perfectly good means. The constitutional rights
to" protection against involuntary servitude are not invaded by
.the Stonecutters Case. The individual can still quit any employment but he can not conspire with others to co-operate with him,
such co-operation in the end resulting in a restraint of trade. The
methods employed by the defendants approaches almost a secondary boycott and consequently could be correctly decide on
the principle of the Duplex Case.
This case exemplifies the progressive tendencies of the
courts to recognize the facts that a large co-operating body of
men must have some limit placed on their actions in procuring
their ultimate ends.

-THOMAS

V. HAPPER.
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NEGLIGENCE--Contributory Negligence As a Matter of
Law. On October 20th, 1927, the case of Baltimore and Ohio
Rd. v. Goodman was argued before the Supreme Court of the
United States and ten days later Justice Holmes handed down a
short decision which was contrary to a long line of decisions
which have been universally recognized as the law in both the
state and federal courts heretofore. (Baltimore and Ohio Ry. Co. V.
Goodman, 48 Ct. 24).
The facts of the case are relatively simple, concerning which,
there was much contradictory testimony. Nathan Goodman was
driving a Ford truck in the village of Whitfield, near Dayton
Ohio. The Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company has a right
of way running through the village and upon approaching its
tracks Goodman retarded the speed of his truck to a rate of five
or six miles an hour. A building which was situated on the
corner of the railroads right of way and the road upon which
Goodman was driving obstructed his view so that it was impossible for him to obtain a clear vision of the tracks unless he approached to a distance of eighteen feet from the rails. To the
North of the intersection approximately 240 feet down the railroad's right of way there stood an obsolete boxcar adjacent to
the track which also obstructed Goodman's view to the extent
that it was a physical impossibility to see beyond this structure.
A fast passenger train travelling at least sixty miles an hour or
more, boomed down from behind the boxcar and struck Goodman's car, completely demolishing it, and killing him instantly.
It was an undisputed fact that the deceased was not going in
excess of five miles an hour when he reached a point about eighteen feet from the track. It was also uncontroverted that the
deceased could not have seen the train until it reached some
point beyond the boxcar which was approximately 200 feet from
the intersection at which the accident occurred, Goodman heard
no signal or warning as he approached the track. The court of
appeals therefore took into consideration that when Goodman
in his position was eighteen feet from the track, the front of his
machine was nine and one-half feet from the danger point, and
at five miles per hour, he would cover the distance in one second
The Supreme Court disregarded the Court'of Appeals con-
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sideration and held Goodman guilty of contributory negligence
as a matter of la.w, for that he could or could not do in one second's
time. It seems incredible that such a learned body as the
Supreme Court would deem a man led int6 such a death trap
without a warning, guilty of contributory negligence as a
matter of law, because of failure to do the correct act at the
proper time. To merely state the proposition is to answer it.
The leading case of Flannelly v.Delaware and Hudson Rd. Co.
states the rule governing negligence cases thus: "The law requires that one going upon or over a railroad crossing the exercise of such care for his protection as a reasonably prudent person ordinarily would take in the same or like circumstances, including the use of his faculties of sight and hearing. And generally speaking, whether such care has been exercised is a question
of fact for the jury, especially if the evidence be conflicting or
such that different inferences may be reasonably drawn from it."
Tfhis case was decided in the year of 1912 and has been the leading case on the subject of negligence (255 U. S. 597, 603). The
court in the case of Grand Trunk Ry. v. Ives, 144 U. S. 408, 433,
adhered to this rule generally. The case of Wise v. D. L. & W. 81
N. J. L. 3, 397, the court commented in the decision to the effect,
"But when the evidence shows (or so the jury might find) that
he employed every moment after passing the obstructions in
looking and listening for the danger upon the rail, it cannot be
said as a matter of law that he was guilty of contributory negligence because he looked in one direction rather than in the other
when it may be said he had not time to properly examine the
track in both directions." See also, L. E. Ry. v. Summers, 125 Fed.
719.
.The true meaning of this case is well stated in the opinion of
the trial court thus, "In effect, the contention of the railroad company
goes to the extent of urging that in no case of a daylight automobile crossing accident, in which a view of the track can be
had even though but a short distance from the rails, can there
be a recovery." In the Ives Case the court was asked to rule on
a standard of law but it refused saying, "There is no fixed standard in the law by which the court i s enabled to arbitrarily say in
every case what conduct shall be considered reasonable and
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prudent, and what shall be considered ordinary care under any
and all circumstances.
The impossibility of establishing a
standard rule today is as apparent as it was when the Supreme
Court spoke in the Ives Case but evidently the Court accomplished the impossible in the case of Baltimore and Ohio v. Goodman.
It is true that railroads are many times, "held up" by the
injured person and this case .seems like the forerunner of protection against such despicable practice; but at its best it is a
poor means to a worse end. The case places on the auto driver
the absolute duty to alight from his car and scan the tracks
thoroughly in both directions then proceed across them. Such
a duty it followed to the letter might be more negligent in some
cases than the acts done by Goodman. To. carry this mandate
into effect on many crossings where the view is obscure would
be absolute folly because of the consideration that a train travelling at the rate of sixty miles an hour is travelling 88 feet per
second and also that the time consumed looking up and down the
track returning to the car and shifting gears would consume as
much as twenty or thirty seconds. If such procedure took thirty
seconds for example, the train could have travelled in excess of
a quarter of a mile. If the driver under those circumstances
could not see down the track for at least a quarter of a mile he
would not have been any better off than Goodman's widow was
in the case decided against her. Can the reader imagine a
crowded highway on a Sunday afternoon with each and every
driver of an automobile stopping at each crossing, alighting,
then peering down the railroads right of way in both directions
and finally re-entering the car he drives across the tracks amid
the squawking din of irate motorists waiting their turn to do
watchman duty. It sounds absurd but nevertheless is plausable.
The decision of Justice Holmes does not place any duty on
the railroads which if deviated from would amount to negligence
as a matter of law. There- is. a statute in Ohio requiring railroads to give proper 'warning by whistle and bell at all crossings
and omission of such requirement amounts to negligence Per Se.
The most credible vitnesses in this case testified that either
there was no whistle blown as-prescribed by the statute, or that
if the whistle was blown it was inaudible. Surely such test-
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imony coming from the lips of eyewitnesses should not be disregarded as facts showing the proximate cause of the accident.
The Supreme Court correctly unshackled the railroads from
the responsibility under which they were impressed when horse
and carriage was the chief means of conveyance. A driver of an
auto enjoys much more control over the progress of his car than
the driver of a horse experienced in attempting to fathoi" its
equine propensities and the former should be charged with a
stricter degree of care and prudence. However, the violent reaction to the abuse railroads had forced upon them by no means
justified such a violent departure from the laws of negligence.
It is certain that the state courts will not follow the doctrines in
tle Goodman Case. The old adage "The king con do no wrong"
seems to be with us again with the railroads as his most honored
guests.
V. HAPPER.
-THoMAs
NEGLIGENCE-Damages too conjectural in action arising
after passing of year. In the case of Hirst v. Chevrolet Motor Co.
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachussets October 21, 1927, there
were separate actions by four plaintiffs, Elizabeth, Isabella,
Sarah, and James Hirst, for damages. The causes were tried in
one case resulting in a verdict for the defendant.
The facts of the case were; the plaintiff 'Elizabeth Hirst
bought a car from the Summer Street Garage at Malden. The
vendor being the local distributor of defendant's cars. The purchase was made June 21, 1923. The plaintiff Elizabeth drove
the car from that time and had several accidents which were not
of a dangerous nature. Each time the car had the necessary repairs and experts had given their opinion that the car was in
good repair. However the plaintiff stated that from the time of
purchase the car had been hard to steer. This she claimed was
due to a defect in the knuckle joint in the steering gear. While
decending a hill, on July 16, 1924 the steering-gear gave way
and the car escaped from the plaintiff's control and colliding
with an obstacle, .it was wrecked, injuring the plaintiffs. The
plaintiffs now contend that the motor company should be liable
for the injuries, because there was negligence in allowing the car
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to leave the factory in a dangerous condition, due to improper
assembling of the steering knuckle. Court held that the evidence
was too conjectural and that the cause stated for the injury was
so remote the defendant could no be held liable for the injuries
to the various plaintiffs. See: 154 N. E. 860., 157 N. E. 581.
-JoHN
P. BERSCI-EID.
NEGLIGENCE-Tort action by guests of auto owner. This
was an action of tort by Emma Gaboury and another to recover
damages for injuries received due to an automobile accident. The
verdict was for the defendant and the plaintiff excepted. The
exceptions were overruled. Gaboury et al v. Tisdell. Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachussets. October 15, 1927.
The plaintiffs were sisters of the defendant's wife and lived
in the home of the defendant. The defandant had invited the
plaintiffs to ride in his car on the day of the alleged accident.
Accompanied by the plaintiffs his wife and his son the trip was
started. Plaintiffs contend that they were not overly anxious
to make the trip as it was Sunday and consequently the traffic
was heavy and in the estimation of the plaintiffs rather' dapgerous. However, the defendant had persuaded them to accompany
him. The plaintiffs were injured and now contend- that though
the defendant was not guilty of gross negligence, he was guilty
of some negligence and as a result should be liable for damages.
But Massaletti v. Fitzroy 228 Mas. 487, holds that when a guest in
a drivers car is injured he is liable for the guests injuries only
when guilty of gross negligence. In the present case the invitation and conversation from and between defedant and plaintiffs did not in any way alter his liability so as to make him liable
for anything less than gross negligence.
-JHN

P. BERSCHEID.

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT-Liability for
sickness arising as result of irrproper place of work. Adtion
brought by the plaintiff for injuries received in defendant's employment. De Pre v. Pacific Coast Forge Company. It appears
that the plaintiff was engaged by the defendant to work in a
room which contained a large vapor tank in which quantities of
sulphuric acid and muriatic acid were mixed, and that the
vapors from these acids escaped and so influenced and affected his
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lungs, and physical resistance to such an extent that as a result,
the plaintiff contracted tuberculosis, which rendered him permanently incapacitated. It was further averred that the defendant had promised to provide proper ventilation for the working room, but he had not done so, and negligence had lain with
accused.
The defendant demurred to the complaint and the demurrer
was sustained. The plaintiff excepted and appeal followed.
Upon appeal, in upholding the trial court's judgment, the
respondent insisted that the Workmen's Compensation Act is a
complete defense, and that the appellant by its term is entitled
to compensation from the state. The respondent further urged
that the appellant assumed the risk; because under' the allegations of the complaint he remained at work for a period of five
months after the promise to remedy the situation (to ventilate
the room).
The court held that it is a matter of common knowledge, ofwhich judicial notice was taken, that lessening the resistance to
tuberculosis by working in vapors from acids has never- been
recognized as within the Workmen's Compensation Act:
Failure to amend the Compensation Act raises the a*sumption that its administration is in accord with the legislative intent. For this action to come under the protection of the act, it
is necessary that the injury be within the category of "accident",
since injury is dependable, to be within the scope of the statute,
upon some fortuitous event. Fortuitous is defined as, occuring
by chance, coming or taking place without any cause, accidental,
casual. To receive compensation from the state there must be
some unexpected or sudden happening from which a report or
claim can be made which is referrable to a definite time, place,
and cause.
The court, in answer to respondent's argument of assumption of risk. held that the point was too briefly argued, and too
indefinite as to the facts.
It may be of interest to note the conflict of opinion on this
question. It appears that the two coastal regions hold in direct
opposition. The Maryland Court of Appeals in Victor Sparkler and
Specialty Co. v. Mavrk's; 147 Md. 368; 128 Act. 635; 44 A. L. A.
363, held when the plaintiff, a young girl, who had contracted
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phosphorous poisoning by inhaling fumes negligently permitted
to accumulate in the room where she worked, held this to be an
accident and within the scope of the Workmen's Compensation
Act.
The Supreme Court of Washington met this case with the
answer that it was lot the weight of authority. But to the
writer, it seems to be the more just and equitable rule, and within
the scope of the law.
The Workmen's Compensation Act is remedial and should
be given,& liberal construction, so as to give the most beneficial
operation. See 28 R. C. L. 755. The salient purpose of the act
is to put to an end private litigation and controversy. fn other
words, the statue has given to labor what it never had before, and
has taken away from capital what it had always enjoyed and
has compensated the latter by limiting its liability.
The legislative intent was to include within the act every
injury which could be suffered. by any worker in the course of his
employment. Boggot Co. v. Illinois Commission, 290 Ill. 530; 7
A. L. A. 1011.
Nor can the fundamentally accidental nature of the injury
be altered by the consideration that the infection was gradualthroughout an indefinite period. The infection is the accidental
injury and whatever follows in casual connection are but consequences which measure the duratioti and effect of the injury.
As suggested by Lord JBerkenshand in Grant v. Kynosh, A. C. 765;
7709 B. R. C. 478--"The infection of the disease which is the
injury, the assault being deemed the accident.
The adjective accident is not a technical term, but a common
one, whose popular would not necessarily mean that the words
"accidental injuries" indicate the existence of an accident, but
rather the idea that the injury was etiher unintended or unexpected. See Hay. L. R. pp. 338-342.
In jurisdictions where an accident was the test, compensability
and disease were excluded, there has been a tendency toward a more
liberal theory of compensation since the decision of Brenton v. Genvey A. C. 230: 2 Ann. case 137. Also for list of cases in accor.
see Ann. 371, 44 A. L. R.
-T. J. JONES, JR.

